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Sovereignty and human rights typically are seen as fundamentally opposed:  the rights of 
states pitted against the rights of individuals; 1648 (the Peace of Westphalia) versus 1948 (the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights).  Sovereignty entitles states to non-interference in 
their internal affairs.  There would seem to be few more purely internal matters than how a 
state treats its own nationals on its own territory.  But that is precisely the focus of 
internationally recognized human rights.  International human rights obligations thus are 
regularly presented as  
• assaulting (Mills 1998: 10; Clapham 1999: 533; Cardenas 2002: 57),  
• challenging (Aceves 2002; Butenhoff 2003: 215-216), 
• besieging (Weiss and Chopra 1995),  
• undermining (Schwab and Pollis 2000: 214),  
• busting (Lutz 1997: 652),  
• weakening (Jacobsen and Lawson 1999),  
• chipping away at (Kearns 2001: 522),  
• compromising (Krasner 1999b: 125), 
• contradicting (Forsythe 1989: 6) 
• breaking down (Bettati 1996: 92),  
• breaching (Lyons and Mayall 2003: 9),  
• perforating (van Hoof 1998: 51), or  
• eroding (Ayoob 2002: 93; Henkin 1999: 3-4; Lapidoth 1995) 
state sovereignty -- which is portrayed as giving way (Aceves 2002: 265), even surrendering 
(Lauterpacht 1968 [1950]: 304-311), to higher human rights norms that "provide legal and 
moral grounds for disregarding the sovereign rights of States." (Shen 2000: 435)  "Human 
rights have revolutionized the international system and international law." (Henkin 1995: 43-
44) 
I offer a substantially different reading.  Sovereignty has been modestly transformed, rather 
than undermined or eroded, by human rights.  The reshaping of sovereignty by human rights 
has left states today no less sovereign than they were fifty, a hundred, or three hundred and 
fifty years ago.  Contemporary human rights constraints on the freedom of action of states 
are completely compatible with "full" "Westphalian" sovereignty.  Rather than 1948 
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challenging, let alone triumphing over, 1648,1 the society of states has made space for human 
rights within the practices of state sovereignty.    
1. SOVEREIGNTY 
Confusion over the term sovereignty is a common lament.  "No once meaningful word has 
become more misunderstood and misused."(Best 1995: 778;  Compare James 1999: 457; 
Henkin 1999: 1; Brownlie 2003: 105-106; Crook 2001)  At the core of most well established 
uses, however, is the idea of supreme authority. (Compare Philpott 2001: 16) 
"Sovereign" comes from the Old French soverain, from the Latin superanus, from super, above.  
A sovereign is superior, supreme, or pre-eminent.  The Oxford English Dictionary thus defines 
sovereign as "one who has supremacy or rank above, or authority over, others; a superior; a 
ruler, governor, lord, or master;" "the recognized supreme ruler of a people or country;" "of 
power, authority, etc.: supreme."  Put more negatively, to be sovereign is to be subject to no 
higher authority.  Alan James' account of sovereignty as constitutional independence (1986; 
1999) nicely captures this central idea.  Or, as I often put it in teaching, sovereignty means 
never having to say you are sorry. 
International law replicates this ordinary understanding. "Sovereignty is supreme 
authority."(Jennings and Watts 1992: 122)  "Sovereignty is the supreme power by which any 
State is governed."(Wheaton 1866: 31)  "The sovereign is the person to whom the Nation 
has confided the supreme power and the duty of governing."(Vattel 1916 [1758]: Bk. II, Ch. 
IV)  "Sovereignty. 1) Supreme dominion, authority, or rule. 2) The supreme political 
authority of an independent state. … Supremacy, the right to demand obedience." (Black's 
Law Dictionary, 7th edition, 1999)  A sovereign state "is not subject, within its territorial 
jurisdiction, to the governmental, executive, legislative, or judicial jurisdiction of a foreign 
State or to foreign law other than public international law." (Steinberger 2000: 512) 
My focus will be on external or international sovereignty, the rules by which sovereigns, 
actors who recognize no higher authority, interact.  My focus is further limited to 
sovereignty practices of modern international society, not philosophical theories or the 
desirability of sovereignty.  This section considers sovereignty in general.  The following 
section examines the impact of human rights on state sovereignty (and vice versa). 
 
 
                                                 
1 "The Peace of Westphalia was not a clear break with the past:  political entities with exclusive control over a 
well-defined territory existed well before the Peace, and feudal and universal institutions … continued well 
after it." (Krasner 1993: 235)  For ease of exposition, however, I will accept the standard iconographic 
representation of Westphalia.  My argument emphasizes contingency and variability in sovereignty practices.  
It would only be strengthened by emphasizing the "slow extruding" (Krasner 1993: 235) of modern 
sovereignty practices. 
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A. Authority, Capability, and Power 
Sovereignty is a matter of authority, the right to regulate or rule.  It is often, however, 
confused with control over outcomes.   
• "Current legal theory [holds] that countries are totally able to determine their own 
internal policies."(Brown and Alexander 1994)  This is nonsense.  Sovereignty is the 
right, not the ability, to determine one's policies.  Like any right it may or may not be 
effectively enjoyed, infringed, violated, or ignored.    
• "Sovereignty … has become … steadily less absolute.  Even for a so-called 
superpower … internationalism is inescapable."(Howe 1995: 129)  Unilateralism and 
internationalism, however, have nothing to do with sovereignty (supreme authority in 
one's own territory).  They concern the costs and benefits of unilateral and collective 
action. 
• "No sovereign state, and not all state sovereignties together, seem to be sovereign 
enough to solve the problems … [of] our human society at the end of the twentieth 
century."(Henkin 1999: 6)  Sovereign authority, however, is no guarantee of the 
capability to solve any particular problem. 
Sovereignty and control are subtly interconnected yet clearly distinguished.  Raw power may 
over time become a source of authority.  Authority usually is an important source of control.  
Conversely, if the link between authority and control is severed completely, authority may be 
undermined or lost.  We can even say that most political power involves a complex 
combination of capabilities and authority, which mutually support and reinforce one 
another. 
Nonetheless, "interdependence between phenomena does not make them one and the 
same."(Goldman 2001: 62)  Capabilities and authority -- force and legitimacy -- are very 
different kinds or sources of power.  Especially where they lie in different hands, we must 
avoid the pitfalls of both "legalism" (considering formal authority while ignoring the realities 
of power and control) and "realism" (considering raw, lawless power while ignoring the 
realities of right and authority).  
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Actors with supreme authority are, by definition, sovereign.  If they also have low 
capabilities they are weak but formally sovereign.  We must resist the temptation to say 
"merely" formally, though, because sovereignty is essentially formal, a matter of rights and 
authority.  Effective control adds something else to, rather than perfects, sovereignty.  
Actors with no authority but high capabilities exercise domination, which is not imperfect 
sovereignty but a different type of rule. 
B. The Sources of Sovereignty  
Three aspects of the sovereignty practices of the modern society of states deserve special 
attention: 
• The sources of sovereignty -- where does it come from? 
• The subjects of sovereignty -- who holds it?  
• The rights of sovereignty -- what does it give you? 
The (objective) criteria of statehood specified in international legal manuals -- typically, a 
government that exercises control over a territory and a population and participates in 
international law -- are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions.  Not all sovereign states 
 
 
Jack Donnelly Human Rights and State Sovereignty
 
5
Donnelly: State Sovereignty and Human Rights
Published by Digital Commons @ DU, 2004
5 
 
meet these criteria:  consider "failed" states.  And some entities that do, most notably 
Taiwan, are universally considered not to be sovereign.   
Sovereignty arises not from a pre-existing internal power or authority that imposes itself on 
other states but from the mutual recognition of exclusive jurisdictions.2  Sovereigns are those 
whose sovereignty is recognized by (the society of) sovereign states.  International 
recognition creates rather than acknowledges rights.  Even where recognition is caused by 
the power of a state or its allies, it has an essential constitutive dimension.  What Chayes and 
Chayes (1995) call "the new sovereignty," the right to participate fully in international law 
and politics, is another way of formulating the constitutive character of sovereignty.  But this 
has always been an essential part of modern sovereignty practices. 
When at Westphalia the parties agreed not to seek to impose a particular confession on one 
another, they created the resultant sovereign rights.  The differences between the Gold Coast 
in 1950 and Ghana in 1960 were largely due to the (constitutive) granting of independence 
and its international recognition.  The contrasting statuses of Slovenia and Kosovo or 
Georgia and Chechnya are more recent illustrations.   
Or consider what Robert Jackson (1990) calls "quasi-states."  These extremely weak states 
(located at the bottom left of Figure 1) exist not because of their own power (or the power 
of allies) but because they have been internationally recognized.  The pejorative "quasi" 
suggests that something is fundamentally wrong with these states.  Their sovereignty, 
however, is in no way defective.  Quite the contrary, internationally recognized sovereignty is 
the principal power resource of these states and the elites that control them. (Clapham 1999) 
In a world of power politics, the standard route to sovereignty is the capability to maintain 
one's independence, alone or with the help of allies.  The existence of numerous "quasi-
states" is evidence of a very different sovereignty regime, rooted in distinctive post-colonial 
conceptions of self-determination and sovereign equality.  But the sovereignty of "Real-
states" no less than that of "quasi-states" is constituted through mutual recognition within 
the society of states. 
C. The Subjects of Sovereignty 
Who are the subjects of sovereignty, the holders of supreme authority?  States is the obvious 
answer today.  But this need not be the case.   
 
 
                                                 
2 Recall that our topic here is external or international sovereignty.  Internal sovereignty, by contrast, has, 
within modern Western history, rested on grounds that include divine donation, prescription, legitimate 
succession, and (most recently) the will of the people.   
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Most sovereigns in early modern Europe were real flesh and blood rulers -- "Kings, and 
Persons of Soveraigne authority," as Hobbes put it in Chapter 13 of Leviathan, published just 
three years after Westphalia.  These sovereigns recognized each other, not abstract territorial 
entities.  For example, the first article of the Peace of Westphalia speaks of a peace "between 
his Sacred Imperial Majesty, and his most Christian Majesty; as also, between all and each of 
the Allies, and Adherents of his said Imperial Majesty, the House of Austria, and its Heirs, 
and Successors; but chiefly between the Electors, Princes, and States of the Empire on the 
one side; and all and each of the Allies of his said Christian Majesty, and all their Heirs and 
Successors." 
Well into the Westphalian era "sovereignty meant proprietary kingship" in which the 
monarch "regarded and treated the state as the private patrimonial property of the reigning 
dynasty."(Teschke 2002: 9, 13; Compare van Creveld 1999: 170-175)  Territory, rather than 
being a fixed and defining attribute of a polity, more or less came with the ruler.  Sovereignty 
remained fundamentally dynastic (rather than territorial) well into the eighteenth century:  
consider the wars of the Spanish (1702-1713) and Austrian (1740-1748) successions.  The 
Holy Alliance illustrates the persistence of the dynastic principle into the nineteenth century. 
Modern dynastic and territorial sovereignty share a unitary conception:  one sovereign per 
polity.  The Oxford English Dictionary, however, includes definitions that attribute sovereignty 
to mayors and to superiors of monasteries and convents.  The medieval and early modern 
division of authority between Pope and Emperor and between the Emperor and other 
princes also suggests a decentralized or functional conception of divided sovereignty.  As the 
leading British authority on international law notes, "sovereignty is divisible both as a matter 
of principle and as a matter or experience."(Brownlie 2003: 113)   
The idea of multiple sovereignties within a territory has few implications for contemporary 
international human rights.  It does, however, point to the extremely relevant fact that 
sovereigns need not have supreme authority over all matters within a territory.   
D. The Rights of Sovereigns 
"The original meaning of the word is simply 'superiority', without any connotation of 
absoluteness or illimitability."(Brierly 1958: 19-20)  In practice, modern sovereigns have 
never had total license or absolute authority over everything.  As no less a realist than Georg 
Schwarzenberger put it, "State practice is unanimous in its affirmation of the existence of 
legal rules … in the relations between sovereign States."(1951: 89)  "Sovereignty is a legal 
status within but not above public international law. … As a juridical status protected by 
international law, it is embedded within the normative order of this law ."(Steinberger 2000: 
512, 518)   
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From 1648 on sovereigns have been restricted in what they could legitimately do even to 
their own nationals in their own realms.  The Treaty of Westphalia, while mandating 
religious non-interference, the foundation for a broader principle of non-intervention, 
imposed substantive restrictions on sovereigns.  For example, Article 28 guarantees 
adherents of the Confession of Augsburg "the free Exercise of their Religion, as well in 
publick Churches at the appointed Hours, as in private in their own Houses."  External 
sovereignty (with respect to religion) was established simultaneously with, and contingent 
upon, restrictions on sovereign prerogatives. 
The rights of the sovereign are not only limited but contingent and variable.  "The status of 
statehood can be associated with various sets of rights and duties.  It carries no given, 
determinate, normative implications."(Koskenniemi 1991: 408)  The (international societal) 
constitution of sovereignty has changed substantially throughout the Westphalian era.  New 
rights are recognized.  Old rights are lost.  But through it all, sovereigns have remained fully 
sovereign.   
The most striking example lies at the heart of realist high politics.  In the nineteenth century 
a sovereign state was the sole judge of what was necessary for self-preservation.  This was 
taken to imply a right to go to war when, where, and for whatever reason it chose.(e.g., 
Wheaton 1866: §290)  "The prevailing view was that resort to war was an attribute of 
statehood and it was accepted that conquest produced title."(Brownlie 2003: 697)  Today the 
legitimate use of force is restricted to self-defense.  But we certainly would not say that the 
United States was less sovereign in 1990 than 1890 because it had no right to launch a war 
for national gain or territorial conquest. 
Or consider the "sovereign right" to control one's exchange rates and money supply.  Under 
the classic gold standard states had no such right.  Under the Bretton Woods system of fixed 
exchange rates they did.  Today the power of international financial markets and institutions 
has provoked concern over the loss of economic sovereignty.(e.g. Matthews 1997: 57; 
Chossudovsky 1998: 309; Lowenfeld 2002)  But if Britain, the United States, France, and 
Germany were economically sovereign in 1900 -- and no one at the time doubted that they 
were -- they were economically sovereign in 2000 as well.   
The growing permeability of borders is another frequently advanced example of eroding 
sovereignty.(e.g. Mills 1998: 1, 25-26, 122)  States today, however, have at least as much 
authority to control trans-border population flows as they did in the early nineteenth 
century, before passports began to be widely used.  Turning from authority to capabilities, 
the borders of almost all states are less permeable to the flow of people today than they were 
a hundred years ago.  And even if all we do is measure levels of flows, at least in the case of 
the United States the total numbers are about equal for the first two and last two decades of 
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the twentieth century, and as a percentage of population are substantially lower today than a 
century ago.  To talk of a loss of sovereignty today would again require us to make ridiculous 
claims about the absence of sovereignty in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
The variability of sovereignty extends even to sovereign equality, which with some justice 
has been described as "the essence of our understanding of the Westfalian [sic] system," 
(Rosas 1995: 63)a principle that "has attained an almost ontological status in the structure of 
the international legal system."(Kingsbury 1998: 600)  Sovereign equality has meant very 
different things in the seventeenth century world of dynastic sovereignty, the nineteenth 
century world of Great Power politics, and the post-colonial world of the late twentieth 
century.  And throughout the Westphalian era, sovereign equality has been understood to be 
fully compatible with different states possessing different rights.   
Honors, titles, and status differences were of considerable importance in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries.(e.g., Vattel 1916 [1758]: Bk. I, ch. XV, § 191; Bk. II, ch. III, esp. § 
37, 48; Bk. IV, ch. VI, §79)  Great Powers in the nineteenth century had special rights and 
responsibilities (Simpson 2004: esp. ch. 4) -- a practice that lingers today in the veto in the 
Security Council.  Many states created in the nineteenth century (e.g. Belgium and Greece) 
operated under treaty restrictions that limited the range of their rights.  The League 
Minorities System imposed obligations on some states but not others.  And so forth. 
Of course, not every change in rights would leave sovereignty undiminished.  Were states to 
lose authority over a wide range of activities central to prevailing conceptions of the nature 
of politics we might be justified, even compelled, to talk of a loss of sovereignty.  
Nonetheless, the rights of sovereigns are and always have been variable.  And sovereignty -- 
except perhaps the sovereignty of God -- never has been absolute and over everything.   
The rights of sovereigns are determined by the practices of (the society of) sovereign states, 
not by theoretical or conceptual logic.  "It is widely accepted that no subject is irrevocably 
fixed within the reserved domain" of sovereign prerogative. (Brownlie 2003: 291)  As the 
Permanent Court of International Justice authoritatively put it, "whether a certain matter is 
or is not solely within the jurisdiction of a state is essentially a relative question; it depends 
upon the development of international relations."3   
"Sovereignty is not merely a bundle of rights, but consists in a status (being sovereign) and in 
the use of this status to legitimize certain rights, duties and competences (the sovereign 
rights)." (Werner and De Wilde 2001: 297)  The status of recognized supremacy defines 
sovereignty and has remained constant through variations in the details of sovereign rights.  
 
 
                                                 
3 Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco (1923) P.C.I.J. Ser. B., no. 4, p. 24.   
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The specific bundle of rights, which is contingent and variable, determines only the 
particular character of sovereignty.  So long as states are not constitutionally subordinated to 
another actor they remain sovereign.  So long as rights previously held are not transferred to 
a "higher" authority, no sovereignty (supremacy) has been lost. 
E. Sovereignty:  Social Reality not Organized Hypocrisy 
To pull together many of the points made above and set up some of the discussion of 
human rights and sovereignty below, I conclude this section by contrasting my analysis with 
that of Stephen Krasner, who extensively documents the failure of state practice to 
correspond to "the Westphalian model" of complete and absolute state autonomy.4  Despite 
this superficial similarity, Krasner offers a fundamentally opposed account of sovereignty 
rooted in an implausible and unhelpful analysis of its meaning and significance.   
Krasner repeatedly claims that any external "influence" on domestic political institutions 
violates sovereignty. (1999b: 33, 121, 226; 1995: 116, 127)  "Westphalian sovereignty is 
violated when external actors influence or determine domestic authority structures." (1999b: 
20)  Using the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in lobbying one's own government, 
according to Krasner, infringes sovereignty. (1999b: 32)  If a treaty alters domestic views on 
an issue, sovereignty has been violated. (1995: 127)  The influence of the Catholic church on 
beliefs about abortion and birth control is, for Krasner, a transgression of sovereignty. (1995: 
116)  He even considers the exclusive economic zones created under the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea a violation of sovereignty (because they involve 
less than perfect rights of territorial sovereignty). (1999b: 36; 1995: 116)  By creating new 
rights for themselves where they previously had none, Krasner would have us believe that 
states -- without knowing it; in fact, thinking that they are doing something quite different -- 
violated their own sovereignty!   
If we were to follow Krasner, most of foreign policy, to the extent it is successful, would 
have to be considered a violation of sovereignty, because it seeks to influence other states to 
act in particular ways.  The same is true of international law, which aims to and often 
 
 
                                                 
4 Krasner actually identifies four senses of sovereignty, but focuses on what he calls international legal 
sovereignty (recognition of sovereign status) and Westphalian sovereignty (autonomy). (1999b: 3-4, 10; 1999a: 
40-49)  Taken together, they encompass sovereignty understood as supreme authority.  I do not, however, 
distinguish Westphalian and international legal sovereignty, because in practice they are inseparable.  
Recognizing a state as sovereign grants it not merely an abstract status but also the rights of sovereignty (i.e., 
autonomy and supreme authority over certain activities).  Conversely, those who have autonomy as a matter 
of sovereign rights, rather than mere capabilities, are those whose legal status as sovereign is recognized.  
(Thus Krasner is mistaken to claim (1999a: 35) that Taiwan has Westphalian sovereignty.  The autonomy that 
Taiwan enjoys is not a matter of sovereign right.)   
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succeeds in influencing the decisions of states.  This is clearly an untenable conception of 
sovereignty, a stipulative theoretical model with little connection to the realities of 
international law and politics. 
Krasner claims that his purpose is to "understand what sovereign statehood has meant in 
actual practice." (1999b: 5)  This cannot be done by judging practice according to standards 
that contradict those of the participants.  Krasner's absolutist "Westphalian model" is 
rejected by the practice and self-understandings of the society of states.   
Particularly striking is his insistence that treaties (contracts and conventions) that restrict a 
state's autonomy violate sovereignty. (1999b: 7, 26, 33-36, 40, 224, 226; 1995: 124-135)  This 
view has been authoritatively rejected, repeatedly.  "Restrictions on the exercise of sovereign 
rights accepted by treaty by the state concerned cannot be considered as an infringement of 
sovereignty."5  "The Court declines to see in the conclusion of any Treaty by which a State 
undertakes to perform or refrain from performing a particular act an abandonment of its 
sovereignty."6  
However we define sovereignty, though, violations are frequent and often striking.  This 
leads Krasner to label sovereignty "organized hypocrisy," which he defines as a situation in 
which "institutional norms are enduring but frequently ignored."(1999b: 66)   
Almost all social norms, though, are frequently ignored.  By Krasner's standard, most of 
social life is "organized hypocrisy."  Stop signs, marriage, property, courtesy, honesty among 
friends, taxation, and equal protection of the laws are "organized hypocrisy".  For that 
matter, so is Realpolitik:  the norm of pursuing power is frequently ignored in favor of 
legality, compassion, or furthering the interests of friends or campaign contributors.   
Krasner claims to be writing in opposition to "the failure to recognize that the norms and 
rules of any international institutional system, including the sovereign state system, will have 
limited influence and always be subject to challenge." (1999b: 3)  But who actually has ever 
failed to recognize this? -- or that sovereignty has not always "prevented the powerful from 
violating its precepts"? (1995: 149)  or that state authority "has always been problematic and 
could never be taken for granted"? (1999a: 34)  Despite emphasizing that Westphalian 
sovereignty is about authority rather than control, (1999b: 10, 223) Krasner ultimately 
refuses to take seriously the fact that infringements of rights are a normal part of social and 
political life, nationally and internationally.   
 
 
                                                 
5 Jurisdiction of the Danube Commission (1927) P.C.I.J. Ser. B., No. 14, p. 36. 
6 The S. S. Wimbledon (1923) P.C.I.J. Ser. A, no. 1, p. 25. 
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If it really were true that "talk and action do not coincide" (Krasner 1999b: 8; Compare 
1999a: 49) -- never, or even only rarely -- we would have organized hypocrisy in an 
interesting sense of that term.  But all Krasner shows is that principle and practice often 
diverge.  This is true of virtually all principles and practices, national no less than 
international.  It is what makes principles principles and norms norms, rather than laws of 
nature.   
"In practice, the strong have been better able to enjoy their territorial integrity and autonomy 
than the weak."(1995: 147)  This is true of almost all rights, domestically as well as 
internationally.  So long as "departures from the standard norm have not … generated 
alternative logics of appropriateness" (1999b: 8) -- and Krasner agrees that they have not -- it 
is simply a reminder that authority is no guarantee of effective control.   
Sovereignty is not a hard shell, an impermeable barrier at the borders of a territory.  It does 
not guarantee the efficacy of the unfettered will of the state.  Sovereignty is a complex social 
practice that allocates jurisdiction, rights, and obligations among sovereigns, actors that 
recognize no superior.7   
Like all social practices, sovereignty both persists and is transformed over time.  But 
Krasner's work, for all the interesting historical material he presents, is fundamentally 
ahistorical, even anti-historical.  By imposing a static stipulative theoretical model, he 
obscures the reality of sovereignty in practice.  And a narrow focus on deviations from that 
model diverts our attention from changes in the pattern of practice over time.  Krasner thus 
misses important transformations in sovereignty -- including, I will argue, those produced by 
the development of the global human rights regime. 
2. HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
Human rights, far from undermining or eroding state sovereignty, are embedded within 
sovereignty.  Dominant understandings of sovereignty (and human rights) have indeed been 
significantly reshaped.  But sovereignty remains robust and, at least with respect to human 




                                                
A. National Implementation o  Internationally Recognized Human Rights 
If human rights are universal rights held equally and inalienably by all individuals, how could 
they not be fundamentally opposed to the supreme authority of states?  The simple answer is 
 
7 Some of the better known works of the past decade that share this general perspective include (Bartelson 
1995), (Fowler and Bunk 1995), (Weber 1995), (Bierstecker and Weber 1996), and (Philpott 2001). 
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that actual legal and political practice has made human rights and state sovereignty fully 
compatible.   
The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948), the International Human Rights 
Covenants (1966), and several single-issue treaties and declarations establish an impressive 
body of international legal obligations.8  These instruments regularly use the language of 
universal rights:  "No one shall be …," "Everyone has the right …"  But universal human 
rights have been embedded in a statist system of national implementation.   
The international human rights obligations of states are solely to their own nationals (and 
others under their territorial jurisdiction).  States have neither a right nor a responsibility to 
implement or enforce the human rights of foreigners on foreign territory.  And international 
supervision of national human rights practices is extremely restricted.   
Considerable international monitoring takes place.  Numerous human rights treaties require 
periodic reports to an international committee of experts.  With the six principal 
international human rights treaties having an average of 161 parties,9 this amounts to a not 
negligible quantity of formal international scrutiny.  The United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights also examines human rights situations in countries of concern and for 
selected rights.  National and transnational NGOs assure a surprisingly free flow of 
information on human rights practices.  Some states have made monitoring human rights an 
integral part of their foreign policy.  But with very limited exceptions -- primarily weak and 
rarely used individual complaint mechanisms and a strong system of regional judicial 
enforcement in Europe -- implementation and enforcement are left to states in their own 
territories.10   
There is nothing particularly surprising about this sovereignty-respecting construction of 
international human rights.  International society remains largely a society of sovereign 
states.  Most international law is implemented and enforced nationally.  Human rights have 
simply been incorporated into the established state-based system of international law and 
politics.   
How states treat their own nationals on their own territory has become a legitimate, and 
increasingly regular and important, topic in bilateral, multilateral, and transnational 
 
 
                                                 
8 For an extensively hyper-linked collection of approximately one hundred instruments, see http:// 
www.unhchr.ch/html/intlinst.htm.   
9 See http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf, which records ratifications through 2 November 2003. 
10 For overviews of the multilateral human rights machinery, see (Donnelly 2003: ch. 8) and (Forsythe 2000: 
ch. 3).  Much more extensively, see (Bayefsky 2000) and (Alston and Crawford 2000).   
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international politics.  States and other international actors are free to use most ordinary 
policy instruments short of the threat of force to influence national human rights practices.   
But the society of states has, with very few and extremely limited exceptions, no significant 
role in the enforcement of human rights.  It simply is not true that "human rights claims no 
longer depend on geographic limitations, and may be as appropriately addressed to the 
broader international community as they are to a nation state's sovereign" (Stacy 2003: 2049) 
-- if those claims are for implementation, enforcement, or legal remedy, which remain the 
domain of states exercising their sovereign prerogatives within their own territories. 
It simply is not true that "human rights [is] an issue area in which conventional notions of 
sovereignty have been compromised." (Krasner 1999b: 125)  States still retain final authority 
-- sovereignty -- over human rights within their territories.  State authority to implement and 
enforce human rights has neither been lost nor, with the limited exception of Europe, 
transferred to another actor.   
B. Constancy and Change in Sovereignty and Human Rights  
"The struggle to establish international rules that compel leaders to treat their subjects in a 
certain way has been going on for a long time." (Krasner 2001: 22; Compare 1999a: 43, 49)  
This is not untrue.   But it obscures the no less important fact that the form and 
consequences of these efforts have changed substantially in the past half century.   
The contemporary global human rights regime is not without precursors.  Largely effective 
international prohibition regimes were established for the slave trade and slavery. (Nadelman 
1990: 491-498; Weissbrodt and Anti-Slavery International 2002)  Minority rights issued were 
recurrently addressed and regulated in limited ways in new states. (Krasner 1999b: ch. 3; 
Claude 1955; Thornberry 1991: pt. 1)  But such isolated, ad hoc and sporadic efforts were 
quantitatively and qualitatively different, in both substance and impact, from the activities of 
the past half century.  There simply was nothing even vaguely like today's comprehensive 
and extensive international concern with human rights.   
Prior to World War II, even talking about human rights violations in other countries, except 
in very limited contexts, was considered an unjustified infringement of states' sovereign 
prerogatives.  Human rights are not mentioned in the notoriously "idealist" Covenant of the 
League of Nations.  There were no multilateral treaties, let alone multilateral institutions, 
devoted to human rights (as opposed to particular rights that we today consider human 
rights).  No states regularly addressed human rights in their foreign policy.  Transnational 
action was extremely limited in both quantity and impact.   
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Much as the sovereign right of self-preservation left states at liberty to launch aggressive 
wars, the sovereign right of political independence left them at liberty to violate (what we 
today call) human rights.  "Until the middle of the twentieth century, States had succeeded in 
juridically protecting their free will; or more precisely, their free willfulness.  International 
law required no behavioral norms, and no obligation of tolerance, in regard to a State's own 
nationals."(Bettati 1996: 91)  Today, however, states can no longer can claim sovereign rights 
to violate human rights.  Authoritative international human rights norms require certain 
kinds of behavior and prohibit others.  We should neither underestimate nor overestimate 
the significance of this change.   
The considerable normative power of the global human rights regime has dramatically 
facilitated the work of human rights advocacy, both by altering domestic conceptions of 
legitimacy and by opening multiple avenues of international and transnational support.  The 
spread of international human rights norms is even part of the explanation for the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and its empire (Thomas 2001), the demise of military and civilian 
dictatorships in Latin America, and processes of political liberalization that are taking place 
in most of Africa and Asia.   
Normative strength, however, is matched by procedural weakness.  The international 
community lacks the authority to stop even gross and systematic violations, except in the 
case of genocide (see below).  Final authority -- sovereignty -- still resides with states.   
 
 
tC. Interna ional Norms and State Sovereignty 
Authoritative international norms have always been part of modern international relations.  
International legal obligations "restrict a States' freedom of action and thereby the exercise 
of its sovereignty, but they do not diminish or deprive it of its sovereignty as a legal status." 
(Steinberger 2000: 512) 
During the first two centuries of the Westphalian era sovereigns were held to be under a 
variety of natural law obligations.  This was not seen as in any way incompatible with 
sovereignty.  Sovereigns remained supreme within their domains, subject -- answerable -- 
only to God. 
In the nineteenth century, the so-called standard of civilization set substantive requirements 
for fully equal participation in international relations.  But the prohibition of "barbarous" 
behavior was completely compatible with the "full sovereignty" of civilized states -- a status 
that was available to "barbarous" states that changed their practices to meet the standard, as 
Japan did in the 1890s.  Again, despite normative restrictions on the range of legitimate 
action of states, there was no subordination to a higher (legal or political) authority.  And any 
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inequality that arose from the doctrine was a matter of some sovereign states not meeting 
"universal" substantive standards. 
Today, in addition to international human rights norms, states, largely irrespective of their 
will, are bound by the norms of customary international law, obligations erga omnes, and jus 
cogens.  And they are bound by a wide range of treaty-based obligations.  So long as 
international obligations do not subordinate states to a higher authority -- and they clearly do 
not in the case of the global human rights regime -- they are completely compatible with full 
sovereignty.  Supremacy means that one is subject to no higher authority, not that one's 
authority is absolute and unlimited. 
Sovereignty is always changing, as states, individually and collectively, grapple with new 
problems and opportunities, pursue new interests, elaborate new norms, and learn from their 
past practices.  Transformations of sovereignty reflect a process of articulating new norms, 
and new understandings of old norms, into the framework of international law and politics.  
Over the past half century, human rights have been widely, and increasingly deeply, 
incorporated into the practices of international law and politics, and thus insinuated into our 
understanding of sovereignty.   
No less importantly, though, sovereignty has been insinuated into our understandings of 
internationally recognized human rights.  Implementation lies ultimately with sovereign 
states.  The politics of international human rights still is largely about influencing sovereign 
states. 
D. Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect 
Genocide is the principal, and recent, exception to the rule of national implementation.  It is 
now generally accepted that multilateral armed intervention against genocide is permitted if 
authorized by the Security Council.11  Genocide thus has been removed from the sphere of 
sovereign prerogative.  To the extent that enforcement authority has been transferred to the 
society of states, we can even speak of a (tiny) loss of sovereignty. 
This does not, however, suggest more radical changes.  The right of states to commit 
genocide has suffered the same fate as the right of states to wage aggressive war -- with no 
broader implications for sovereignty.  It is a gross exaggeration to talk about contemporary 
practices of humanitarian intervention "subduing sovereignty." (Heiberg 1994) 
 
 
                                                 
11 For an excellent account of the evolution of international practice through Kosovo, see (Wheeler 2000).  
(Murphy 1996)  is a standard legal overview.   
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International enforcement of even a substantial segment of internationally recognized 
human rights would indeed represent a fundamental transformation of our sovereignty 
practices.  Removing such a wide range of politically central issues from the authority of 
states would represent a substantial loss of sovereignty.  But there is no evidence of 
widespread acceptance in theory, let alone in practice, of a right to armed intervention for 
violations of other -- that is virtually all -- human rights.  There is not even evidence in the 
past decade of significant strengthening of regional or global human rights institutions.12  
Genocide, for the next few decades at least, is almost certain to remain the exception that 
proves the rule of national implementation.   
It simply is not true that "a strong claim of sovereignty by a state that is committing human 
rights abuses will not be respected by the international community." (Stacy 2003: 2035)  For 
all human rights other than genocide -- that is, to repeat, for virtually all human rights -- 
states still retain ultimate enforcement authority.  They can and do advance strong claims of 
sovereignty.  And those claims are accepted, however reluctantly, by other states and the 
international community.   
The narrow demarcation of the right to humanitarian intervention can even be seen as 
reaffirming the general principle of non-intervention, and thus state sovereignty.  (Compare 
Malmvig 2001)  It is not exactly the same sovereignty as before, but no less real and robust.   
The increasingly popular language of the responsibility to protect13 is prescriptive or 
predictive, not descriptive.  There is perhaps growing acceptance of a certain moral 
responsibility, but no evidence of an emerging legal duty (responsibility) of humanitarian 
intervention.  The international community has chosen instead to leave itself at liberty, 
legally and politically, to protect or not as it sees fit, guided by no agreed upon principles.   
Even this represents significant, if very limited, humanitarian progress.  New "humanitarian 
space" (Weiss and Chopra 1995) has been created.  But it has been created within rather than 
as an alternative to state sovereignty.   
                                                 
12 Individual international criminal liability under the Statute of the International Criminal Court, the 1984 
Convention Against Torture, and various national laws (e.g., the Alien Torts Claims Act in the United States) 
does represent a significant change in doctrines of sovereign immunity.  But individual liability for violations 
of a few rights has virtually nothing to do with international authority to implement and enforce human rights 
generally.  This not insignificant humanitarian advance represents but a tiny transformation of sovereignty. 
13 The key document is the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(2001; http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/report-en.asp).  The idea was first brought to prominence by 
Francis Deng (1995; 1996).   
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E. Economic and Social Rights 
The relationship between sovereignty and economic and social rights in contemporary 
international relations is complex.  Here I will consider globalization and structural 
adjustment, both of which are regularly seen as eroding sovereignty (e.g., Matthews 1997: 56; 
Buchanan 1998; Rondinelli 2002: 366-367) and threatening economic and social rights.  I will 
argue that the threats to human rights are very real but not connected to eroding sovereignty. 
The threats to economic and social rights posed by internationally-mandated programs of 
structural adjustment14 arise from weakness not lack of authority.  States voluntarily accept 
loans and grants that impose economic and political conditions.  They are free to refuse 
assistance under such terms, as a few states (e.g. Malaysia in the late 1990s) have.  Yet many 
governments are so desperate that they feel as if they have no real choice.  Let us grant, then, 
that there is a coercive aspect to most structural adjustment programs.  
Sovereign authority, however, is no guarantee that exercising that authority will be without 
costs.  If A allies with B because it fears C, A's sovereignty has not been compromised, 
violated, or infringed.  An inventor who gives a substantial share of the stock in her 
company to venture capitalists because she cannot get bank financing has not had her rights 
violated.  And it is no more a violation of sovereign equality that only poor and weak states 
must accept conditional assistance than it is a violation of equal protection of the laws that 
wealthy private borrowers often get better terms than ordinary borrowers.   
Coercion, whether it arises from internal desperation or external pressure, is, up to a point, 
compatible with voluntary choice.  At some point, of course, it is not.  But coercion per se 
no more violates sovereignty than offering positive inducements to behave in a particular 
way.  Only external imposition -- particularly imposition through the threat or use of force -- 
violates sovereign autonomy.  There is a clear qualitative difference between "Take it or 
leave it" and "Your money or your life!" 
Sovereignty is (only) the authority to decide, the right to choose among alternative courses of 
action the one that appears most beneficial or least harmful.  So long as the compulsion 
under which states operate is a matter of choosing between alternatives -- even if all the 
options are unattractive -- sovereignty has not been infringed.  If borrowers have a 
 
 
                                                 
14 Although some groups may benefit even in the short run from structural adjustment programs -- for 
example, farmers and rural laborers may be helped by reductions in food price subsidies -- structural 
adjustment almost always involves significant declines in the enjoyment of some economic and social rights 
for some significant segments of society, often the poor and the marginalized.  See, for example, (Sadasivam 
1997), (Halvorsen and Michelsen 2002), and (Morgan-Foster 2003).   
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significant say in negotiating the terms of conditionality we might even say that their 
sovereignty has been actively respected.   
The IMF, for all its power, is not a global central bank.  Nor is the Bank for International 
Settlements.  National central banks still have the authority to set national monetary policy.  
Whether their decisions have negative externalities or will be swamped by those of 
international markets and institutions are questions of capabilities not authority.  The Group 
of 7/8 is a mechanism for leading sovereign states to coordinate policies, not an 
authoritative policy-making body.  The Paris Club is an "informal" (that is, voluntary) 
mechanism for creditor countries to coordinate their relations with each other and common 
debtor countries.  And so forth.   
Globalization presents a very similar picture.  By reducing the ability of states to control and 
tax large firms and capital, globalization has restricted the ability of many states to implement 
economic and social rights.15  But this has nothing to do with eroding economic sovereignty.  
Firms have always had the right to operate globally.  Recently they have begun to acquire the 
ability to take advantage of that right.  States have always had the authority to regulate and 
tax businesses.  Recently they have faced increasing difficulty in using that authority to 
extract resources sufficient to fund social programs at desired levels.   
The balance of power has shifted.  But neither firms nor states have gained or lost 
rights/authority/sovereignty.  The right/authority of states to regulate banks and businesses 
has not been renounced, transferred, or taken away.  The threat to economic and social 
rights posed by globalization cannot be remedied by enhancing state sovereignty.  States 
already have supreme and essentially unregulated authority.      
Some analysts (e.g. Cox 1987; Panitch 1994; Pijl 1998; Robinson 2002) suggest that 
globalization is changing the character of the state -- or state-society complexes -- to a 
transnational or global state oriented towards protecting global (rather than national) capital 
and the interests of an emerging transnational capitalist class.  Here too erosion of 
sovereignty is not the issue.  These threats to economic and social rights arise from the 
purposes for which states exercise their sovereignty.   
 
 
                                                 
15 Although the distributional consequences of globalization are extremely complex, at least some groups 
have suffered and will continue to endure both absolute and relative declines in the enjoyment of economic 
and social rights.  The reports of the Special Rapporteurs on Globalization and its Impact on the Full 
Realization of Human Rights (UN documents E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/13, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/10, and 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/14) provide wide-ranging negative assessments.  See also (McCorquodale and 
Fairbrother 1999: 745-747; Pease 2000; Senarclens 2003: 149-150). 
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I do not mean to underestimate the impact of globalization.  Quite the contrary, 
globalization seems to me by far the gravest threat to human rights to emerge over the past 
two decades, much more serious and widespread than ethnic conflict, which absorbed so 
much of our attention in the 1990s, let alone the recent hysteria over terrorism.  But we must 
understand the nature of the problem if we are to confront it effectively.  It concerns the 
capabilities or intentions of states, not their authority. 
The current system of national implementation of internationally recognized human rights 
leaves economic and social rights dependent on the capabilities of states to extract the 
resources needed to realize the rights of their citizens.  Barring the creation of new 
institutions or duty-bearers, states and human rights advocates alike must grapple with 
developing effective strategies to use the authority and capabilities of states, individually and 
collectively, to assure that internationally recognized economic and social rights are 
effectively realized and enjoyed.  
This might be done in ways that put state sovereignty to productive use.  For example, Third 
World states, with the support of many first world activists and transnational NGOs, 
blocked the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, which would have significantly restricted 
their authority to regulate certain forms of corporate activity.   
Sovereignty, however, may be more of a problem than a solution.  One possible strategy for 
re-asserting control over firms would be for states to pool their authority in a regime of joint 
regulation or even transfer authority to a global regulatory body.  In other words, giving up 
some sovereignty, to gain greater effective control, is one obvious (although politically 
problematic) way to deal with the threats to economic and social rights posed by 
globalization.    
3. CONCLUSION 
The preceding discussion suggests a (limited) decentering of the state.  This might involve 
changes in or transfers of sovereignty.  But states and their sovereignty might simply be 
bypassed or marginalized.  What are the implications for human rights?   
Human rights advocates typically see the state as the problem -- which it often is.  But the 
state is also the principal protector of human rights.  Until we develop alternative 
mechanisms to deliver goods, services, opportunities, and protections to large numbers of 
people -- and it must be emphasized that no substantial progress seems likely in the next 
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couple decades16 -- states, for all their problems, are pretty much what we have in the way of 
legal and political institutions for implementing human rights.   
States per se are neither good nor bad for human rights.  It depends on what particular states 
do in particular circumstances.  Today, in part because of the growth of the global human 
rights regime, more states than ever before respect a wider range of human rights, and fewer 
states than ever before engage in the sort of gross and persistent human rights violations that 
were the statistical norm just a quarter century ago.   
Sovereignty per se is neither good nor bad for human rights.  It depends on which particular 
sovereign rights states have and how they exercise them.  The global human rights situation 
today, although by no means good, is significantly less bad than it has been, in some measure 
because of the way in which human rights have become incorporated into our 
understandings of state sovereignty.   
For all the (amply justified) complaints about the current system of national implementation 
of international human rights, only a small minority of citizens, and few if any states, are 
willing to transfer final authority to other actors over the wide range of important and 
sensitive issues covered by internationally recognized human rights.  People, states, and the 
society of states increasingly value human rights.  But they also value states and sovereignty.  
In the end, they seem satisfied to leave sovereignty tempered and modestly humanized by, 
but in no serious way subordinated to or eroded by, human rights.  This has left human 
rights not a challenger to but deeply embedded within state sovereignty.   
Although my focus here has been analytical rather than normative, I want to close by 
suggesting that this is not, all things considered, such a bad thing.  I agree with Henry Shue 
that "provisions for non-intervention and sovereignty ought to be judged by how well they 
serve fundamental human values, like the protection of rights." (1998: 79)  But that 
judgment must take into account not only ideal standards.  It must also consider practical 
possibilities, including both where we have come from and what alternatives are realistically 
available in the coming years and decades. 
The current situation is hardly ideal -- far from it.  But it certainly is preferable to what 
prevailed before sovereignty was transformed by human rights.  And until we develop 
 
 
                                                 
16 A growing body of literature (e.g. Ratner 2001; Paust 2002; Weissbrodt and Kruger 2003) addresses the 
human rights responsibilities of national and especially transnational businesses.  Most of the discussion, 
however, focuses on corporate violations rather than making firms direct providers of internationally 
recognized economic and social rights.  And the American experience with employer-based access to health 
care -- not to mention the marketplace logic of efficiency that dominates the activities of firms -- suggests that 
we should not place much hope in this alternative. 
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alternative institutions capable of implementing internationally recognized human rights, the 
prudent course is to continue to insist on the combined rights and obligations of states to 
implement and enforce internationally recognized human rights; that is, on the particular 
coordination of human rights and state sovereignty represented by the global human rights 
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